The Hitler-Hess Deception
By Martin Allen
Tonight, at 8:15pm on NTV in the show ‘TECHNIK & TRENDS’ we were shown an Interview with the English Historian MARTIN ALLEN, in which he very clearly stated that according to documents he found in the British Archives, Rudolf Hess flew to Gt Britain with Hitler’s knowledge and with a 7 Point peace plan from Hitler in his pocket.
Hitler’s Peace Plan included:
a) Withdrawal of all German Troops from Poland, Belgium, France & Holland.
b) Reimbursement for war damage to those countries
c) Total German disarmament
d) Destruction of all German war weaponry.
This offer threw the British Government under Churchill who had ready made plans to force Germany into a war into a turmoil and the British knew they couldn’t accept Hitler’s offer, so they threw Hess into Prison and tossed away the key. What also came out of the interview was the fact that the British were not worried about Nazi ‘brutality’ at all but the extremely successful model of government the Germans (Hitler) had devised.
Martin Allen has written all this in his latest book.
And THIS on German TV….heads will roll!!
The Hitler-Hess Deception
By Martin Allen
This text aims to shed light on discoveries which claim to reveal the truth about Rudolph Hess’ solo flight to Britain in May 1941 and explain the British government’s 60-year-long silence as to what the Hess mission was all about. The mystery of the deputy Fuhrer’s flight and subsequent silence has led to a seemingly endless flow of books speculating as to his motives. In 2001 (the 60th anniversary of the flight) more books appeared. But the crucial pieces of evidence which could prove that the British government were playing a game – the outcome of which would have far-reaching effects on the course of the war – have not been found. This book claims to have this very information.
The Man Who Knew Too Much
Reviewer: Thomas Dunskus from F-33760 Faleyras
Martin Allen’s book “The Hitler/Hess Deception” deals with the fate of Rudolf Hess who had been, at one time, Hitler’s deputy and who, in his day, carried the epithet “the conscience of the party”. He was condemned to life imprisonment and served time for half a century until he was found hanged in the prison at Spandau whose only remaining prisoner he then was.
He had left Germany in May, 1941, under mysterious circumstances, and was held essentially incommunicado ever after. At that time, the Nazis had instituted a number of antisemitic laws, they had instigated or at least tolerated a pogrom, and were following an expansionist and aggressive policy, but with some hindsight, one wonders why this man had to be shut up for the rest of his life, whereas other figures among Hitler’s close associates who had played a more active role for a much longer time, were released from jail after a number of years that appear reasonable under normal legal aspects.
The author has gathered together the shreds of evidence that remained after the British in 1945 had collected and destroyed whatever pertinent files they were able to put their hands on and “neutralized” undesirable witnesses. He shows that the “Hess incident” – Hess’ solo flight to Scotland in May, 1941, a month before Germany attacked the Soviet Union – was not at all the feat of a madman decided on at the spur of the moment that it was later made to appear by both the British and the German side. Even (nay, particularly!) Hitler’s deputy could not just get into his personal Messerschmitt 110 and take off for the 1000 mile flight to Prestwick without major technical and logistic preparations in Germany, along the way, and at the other end.
The book explains that the flight as such was the result of a sting operation devised by Britain’s Strategic Operations staff, aimed at making Hitler believe that the British government could be toppled, peace could be made in the West, and the Germans would be able to affront the Soviets without having to worry about their western flank.
According to Allen, in the year prior to Hess’ flight, there had been numerous contacts, mainly in (neutral) Spain and Switzerland, between British representatives and German politicians and intellectuals. The talks in Scotland were to be, as it were, the touchstone of the matter. As time was getting short for the Germans, Hess convinced Hitler that the German delegate should not be a mere emissary acting under orders but a political figure able to take decisions on the spot – Rudolf Hess.
In the end, it makes little difference whether the British were thrown into complete disarray, as Allen asserts, when unexpectedly Hess turned up, or whether a lower-grade delegate would have been able to fly safely back to Germany and report. The British sting operation was effective enough in getting Hitler to continue with his preparations for the war against the Soviet Union and thus remove pressure from Britain. To what extent the British actively encouraged the Germans in their plans, or whether or not they went so far as to promise support cannot be ascertained at the present time – whatever British files still exist seem to be under lock and key for another dozen years or so. Russian sources, on the other hand, may be provide some answers at an earlier date.
What is frightening about the events Allen describes is the apparent lack of scruple with which the British government went about setting the two dictatorships up against each other. The outcome of this duel was not at all certain, for if weather conditions in late 1941 had been just a little more favorable for the German side, the Soviet empire might well have toppled and Britain would then have had to face a Germany extending from the Channel coast to the Urals. This unpleasant but entirely possible risk for Britain is begging the question to what extent Churchill, in order to forestall such a potentially horrifying scenario, did not somehow play a double game by keeping the Soviets informed, and assured of future Allied aid.
Some American, quite a few Russian, and a couple of German historians have recently argued that Stalin, in 1941, was himself preparing to attack Germany. Considering the recent revelations by Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin on the activities of the “Cambridge Five”, it is entirely conceivable that, officially or unofficially, British sources kept Stalin informed of the negotiations. For a man like Stalin whose distrust was legendary, the obvious reaction would have been to prepare against a German attack, possibly by a pre-emptive strike. It is significant that at the time of the sting operation, Anthony Blunt, a member of the Cambridge Five, occupied a key position within MI5; after the war, he was to be involved in the cover-up operations in Germany.
Regardless of who, Stalin or Hitler, would eventually win that confrontation, the only thing that was certain, even in 1941, is that such a war would spell the end of freedom for most of the still independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. The only foreseeable difference would have been that, under Soviet rule, the Slavic states might fare slightly better, whereas countries like Hungary or Romania would have found Hitler somewhat more accomodating. In any case, the fate of the lands in question should have been clear to the Western world when the Germans discovered, in 1943, the graves of thousands of Polish officers murdered by the Soviets at Katyn two years earlier. However, by then it was too late, the Western powers preferred not to take too close a look at the implications, and chose to abandon those countries to the Soviets for the next half century.
A Mystery Explained?
Reviewer: Dr Neil Bathurst from Exminster, Devon United Kingdom
The flight of Rudolf Hess to Britain in 1941 has remained one of the great enigmas of World war Two. Derided as a madman and incacerated for the rest of his life Hess was never able to tell the real truth about his mission. This book, drawing upon secret service documents, seeks to explain that mission. The book argues that in 1940 Churchill realised that Britain had only one hope of survival – that Hitler would invade Russia, thereby ioening a second front. Hitler had, therefore, to be encouraged to invade Russia. To this end the British secret service (using amongst others the then Duke of Kent) duped the Nazis into believing that there was a pro-peace faction in Britain ready to throw out Churchill and sue for peace. To that end a Nazi official was supposed to fly to Scotland for talks. The man who actually arrived was Rudolf Hess.
Fanciful? At first glance yes. However, the evidence presented is compelling. Why for example was the Duke of Kent at Dungavel Castle (Hess’ destination) on the night in question? Why was Britains ambassador to Spain flying to Switzerland on days when Hess was known to have flown out of Germany? If Hess was mad why was he signing government decrees and chairing meetings right up to the day he left?
This is a fascinating book, well researched and well written. Hess remains one of the great enigmas of the war years – this book may explain the extraordinary events of 10th May 1941.